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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH,
PlaintiffTPetitioner,
v.

CaseNo.20020002-SC

ERIC JARVIS WARREN,
Defendant/Respondent.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING
This case is before the Court on a writ of certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals.
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a) and -(5) (Supp. 2002).
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Whether the Court of Appeals1 opinion in State v. Warren« 2001 UT App 346, 37
P.3d 270, is a legally sound decision, based on an analysis of the totality of the
circumstances and Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, confirming that afriskof Warren
was not appropriate during a traffic stop where the searching officer testified that he did
not believe Warren was armed and dangerous and where the facts do not otherwise
establish a reasonable suspicion that Warren had access to weapons or posed a threat.
Standard of Review: On certiorari review, the decision of the Court of Appeals,
not of the trial court, is reviewed for correctness with no deference to its conclusions of
law. See State v. James. 2000 UT 80, ^[8,13 P.3d 576 (citations omitted).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION

United States Constitution Amendment IV - Unreasonable Searches and
Seizures:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant Eric Jarvis Warren ("Warren") was charged by information with two
counts of unlawful possession of a controlled substance, a third degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 1999); one count of carrying a
concealed dangerous weapon, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §
76-10-504 (1999); and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5 (Supp. 1999). R.14-16.
Warren moved to suppress the evidence. R.43-44,47,49-56,130-31. He argued in
part that the evidence was seized pursuant to an illegal frisk in violation of the Fourth
Amendment and Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).
R. 131 [8-10]. The trial court denied the suppression motion and entered findings of fact
and conclusions of law. R.64-64,82-86. The trial court specifically concluded that,
[t]he brief "Terry" frisk of defendant for weapons was not conducted in
violation of the Fourth Amendment. Even though the officer stated he did
not believe the defendant had weapons, the search was supported by an
objective reasonable suspicion that defendant was armed and dangerous.
The search was only conducted for officer safety and was supported by the
following facts: the lateness of the hour, the area, no other traffic, no
residences in area or open business, defendant's odd and inconsistent
2

explanation of his activities, officer[']s belief defendant was engaged in
drugs and prostitution and that people who engage in such activity usually
carry weapons, the officer was alone, the officer was going to impound
defendant's vehicle, and defendant's previous false statement about the
status of his license.
R.84.
Warren entered a conditional guilty plea to possession of a controlled substance.
See Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i); State v. Serv. 758 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1988);
R. 100-07, 111. Warren appealed from the denial of the suppression motion. R. 112-13.
The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded Warren's conviction on the basis that the
frisk was illegal. See Warren, 2001 UT App 346 atffl[12-16.The State petitioned for
certiorari review, which this Court granted in an order dated April 10, 2002.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The Court of Appeals recited the following facts, which accurately reflect the
evidence on the record:
On November 28, 1999, at approximately 4:45 a.m., Officer Nathan
Swensen observed a grey Cadillac pulled over to the side of the road near
the intersection of 200 South and 200 East streets in downtown Salt Lake
City. [R. 130:5.] Occupying the driver's seat of that vehicle was appellant
Warren, a thirty-eight year old African American male. [R. 130:5]. Officer
Swensen also observed another unidentified individual leaning into the
front passenger's side door of Warren's car. [R. 130:5].
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Officer Swensen observed this activity for less than a minute, did not
hear any of the conversation that took place, could not tell what the two
people were doing, and did not recognize the vehicle or individuals from
prior encounters. [R. 130:6,15]. Nonetheless, Officer Swensen assumed
that Warren and the unidentified individual were engaged in a transaction
involving either drugs or prostitution. [R. 130:6-7]. Officer Swensen
testified that he based his suspicion on the fact that it was early in the
morning and there were no open businesses or residences in the vicinity.
[R. 130:6-7]. Despite his suspicions, Officer Warren did not then approach
Warren's vehicle or the unidentified man, who departed on foot. [R. 130:6,16].
Officer Swensen then observed Warren pull away from the curb and
make a left turn onto 200 South, followed by a lane change, without
signaling. [R. 130:6]. Officer Swensen pulled Warren over after observing
the traffic violation. [R. 130:7]. He requested Warren's driver's license and
vehicle registration. [R.130: 8]. Warren readily provided the requested
materials. [R. 130:8]. Officer Swensen noticed that the license had expired
in 1995. [R.130:8]. Warren explained that he had a current license, but that
it had been stolen. [R.130:8].
Officer Swensen then set about to ascertain why Warren was out at that
time of night and what he had been doing with the unidentified man.

4

[R.130:9]. He asked questions regarding who the unidentified man was,
what they were doing, and whether Warren had dropped the man off or just
met him. [R. 130:9]. Warren responded by telling Officer Swensen that his
mother and the man's mother were acquaintances and that he dropped the
man off after they had been together at someone's house. [R. 130:9].
Warren also indicated that he had been looking for packing boxes for his
sister, who was moving. [R. 130:9]. Officer Swensenfs questioning lasted
approximately two minutes. [R. 130:18]. Officer Swensen conceded at the
suppression hearing that these questions were unrelated to and unnecessary
for the proper effectuation of the traffic stop. [R. 130:18].
Officer Swensen returned to his patrol car, checked Warren's license,
and learned that it was otherwise current but had been suspended for failure
to pay reinstatement fees. [R. 130:8-9]. Officer Swensen then decided to
impound Warren's car. [R. 130:10]. He asked Warren to get out of the car
to sign citations for failure to signal and for driving without a valid license.
[R.130:10]. Officer Swensen testified he did not intend to arrest Warren
and only had him exit the vehicle to inform him about the impound and to
sign the citations. [R. 130:21-22].
When Warren was out of the car, Officer Swensen frisked him.
[R. 130:10]. He did not believe that Warren was armed or dangerous, but

5

frisked him as a matter of routine. [R. 130:10,20]. A white plastic "twist,"
later identified as cocaine, fell from Warren's waist during the frisk,
whereupon Warren was arrested. [R.84, 130:20-21]. An inventory search
of Warren's car uncovered a knife concealed under the armrest, and a more
in-depth search of Warren's person, incident to arrest, led to the discovery
of more cocaine and a glass pipe. [R.84].
Warren. 2001 UT App 346 at 1HI2-7.1
In addition, the officer testified that his reasons for the frisk were "[j]ust from
training, and for my safety, and everybody that was there, their safety. Whenever I pull
somebody out of a car, I perform a Terry frisk just to see if there's weapons. Also because
of the fact that with there being drug activity and prostitution and so on, people that are
involved in that usually carry weapons. So with that in mind, also for the fact that I
always do that, perform that Terry frisk when I pull somebody out of a car, that's why I
did it." R.130:10-ll.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Court of Appeals' decision in State v. Warren. 2001 UT App 346, 37 P.3d
270, correctly holds that the frisk of Warren was unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. First, the searching officer testified that

1

Although quotes overfiftywords are traditionally single-spaced in a brief, this
quote has been double spaced for the ease of the reader.
6

he did not suspect Warren was armed and dangerous, and admitted that he only frisked
him as a matter of routine because it was a traffic stop. Moreover, the Court of Appeals
properly assessed the surrounding circumstances of the stop and determine that they did
not otherwise support a reasonable suspicion that Warren posed a threat or was armed.
Warren is in keeping with the appropriately narrow application of Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1968), which allows protective frisks only upon an individualized
suspicion that the person to be frisked is armed and dangerous. Lesser traffic offenses,
such as the one involved in the present case, do not present inherently dangerous
situations where a frisk is automatically justified absent other evidence to the contrary.
Since additional evidence indicating that Warren was armed and dangerous did not exist
in this case, the Court of Appeals correctly held that the frisk was unconstitutional.
ARGUMENT
ISSUE: STATE V, WARREN IS A LEGALLY SOUND DECISION,
BASED ON AN ANALYSIS OF THE TOTALITY OF THE
CIRCUMSTANCES AND FOURTH AMENDMENT
JURISPRUDENCE. CORRECTLY HOLDING THAT A FRISK OF
WARREN WAS NOT APPROPRIATE DURING A TRAFFIC STOP
WHERE THE SEARCHING OFFICER TESTIFIED THAT HE DID NOT
BELIEVE WARREN WAS ARMED AND DANGEROUS AND WHERE
THE FACTS DO NOT OTHERWISE ESTABLISH A REASONABLE
SUSPICION THAT WARREN HAD ACCESS TO WEAPONS OR
POSED A THREAT.
A. The Court of Appeals Followed Fourth Amendment Case Law.
The Court of Appeals properly followed Fourth Amendment case law in holding
7

that the frisk of Warren was not supported by a reasonable suspicion that he was armed
and dangerous. See Warren. 2001 UT App 346 at Tfl6.2 As an initial matter, the
decision is in accord with the fundamental precept that the decision to frisk be based on a
particularized suspicion that the individual to be searched is armed and dangerous. The
Court of Appeals, looking to Terry and quoting this Court's opinion in State v. Carter.
707 P.2d 656 (Utah 1985), properly noted that frisks are permissible only where the
officer '"reasonably believes that the individual may be armed and dangerous .'" Warren,
2001 UT App 346 at 1J13 (quoting Carter. 707 P.2d at 659; citing Terry. 392 U.S. 1)
(emphasis added); see also Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-16 (1999) (statutory authorization for
frisk).
Terry holds under the Fourth Amendment that:
where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him
reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may
2

"On certiorari, we review the court of appeals1 decision for correctness. The
correctness of the court of appeals1 decision depends [first] on whether it accurately
reviewed the [lower court's] decision based on the appropriate standard of review."
County Bd. of Equalization of Wasatch County v. Stichting Mayflower Recreational
Fonds 2000 UT 57, ^|9, 6 P.3d 559 (citing Newspaper Agency Corp. v. Auditing Div..
938 P.2d 266, 267-68 (Utah 1997). In this case, the Court of Appeals applied the correct
bifurcated standard of review, applying a clear error standard to the facts and a
correctness standard to the legal conclusions. See. Warren, 2001 UT App 346 at ^10. It
is well-settled that this standard is applied to mixed questions of fact and law, such as the
constitutionality of a search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment. See State v.
Chevre, 2000 UT App 6,1J6, 994 P.2d 1278 (applying bifurcated standard of review to
question of legality of traffic stop); Statev.Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 935-40 (Utah 1994)
(same).
8

be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and
presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior he
identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and
where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his
reasonable fear for his own or others' safety, he is entitled for the protection
of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the
outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which
might be used to assault him. Such a search is a reasonable search under
the Fourth Amendment, and any weapons seized may properly be
introduced in evidence against the person from whom they were taken.
392 U.S. at 30-31; see also Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-16 (1999) (statutory authorization for
Terry frisk).
Terry further notes:
[t]he officer need not be absolutely certain that the individual is armed; the
issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be
warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger. Cf.
Beckv. State of Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91, 85 S.Ct. 223, 226, 13 L.Ed.2d 142
(1964); Brine gar v. United States. 338 U.S. 160, 174-176, 69 S.Ct. 1302,
1311, 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949); Sta cev v. Emerv. 97 U.S. 642, 645, 24 L.Ed.
1035 (1878). And in determining whether the officer acted reasonably in
such circumstances, due weight must be given, not to his inchoate and
unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch,1 but to the specific reasonable
inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his
experience. Cf Bnnegar[, 338 U.S. at 174-76.]
Id, at 27. As with any Fourth Amendment analysis, reasonableness is the touchstone of
the inquiry. See id at 19; Pennsylvania v. Mimms. 434 U.S. 106, 108-09 (1977).
Reasonableness depends upon the balance between the public interest in fighting crime
and the individual's right to be free from unwarranted intrusion. See Mimms. 434 U.S. at
109 (citing United States v. Brignoni-Ponce. 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975)).
9

In light of Terry and the foregoing principles, the Court of Appeals correctly
recognized "two scenarios" that might give rise to a particularized suspicion that a person
is armed and dangerous. First, "facts and circumstances unique to the particular suspect
and/or factual context may give rise to a reasonable suspicion the suspect may be armed,
such as a suspect with a bulge in his clothing that appears to be a weapon or a suspect
who is hesitant in denying that he is armed and aggressively approaches the officer
immediately upon being stopped." Warren, 2001 UT App 346 at ^15 (citing State v.
Rochelle. 850 P.2d 480,483 (Utah App. 1993)).
The Court of Appeals properly noted that the frisk of Warren was not justified
under this scenario because Officer Swensen himself testified that he did not think that
Warren was armed and dangerous and that he only frisks as a matter of routine. Id. at
^[16. This is consistent with the U.S. Supreme Court's opinion in Ybarra v. Illinois . 444
U.S. 85 (1979), wherein that Court stated, "[t]he 'narrow scope1 of the Terry exception
does not permit a frisk for weapons on less than a reasonable belief of suspicion directed
at the person to befrisked."Id. at 94 (emphasis added) (holding that a search of all bar
patrons, including defendant, for drugs did not satisfy Fourth Amendment individualized
suspicion requirement). If Officer Swensen himself did not believe that Warren was
armed and dangerous, then the reasonable particularized suspicion requirement which
lies at the heart of Terry and the Fourth Amendment is not present. Accordingly, the
Court of Appeals correctly held that the frisk was not justified.
10

The Court of Appeals also noted the second scenario that might give rise to a
legitimate Terry frisk, which occurs when the "inherent nature of the crime being
investigated [] leads to the reasonable suspicion that the suspect may be armed." Warren,
2001 UT App 346 at ^[15. The Court, however, rejected that the frisk of Warren was
justified under this prong as well. Id. atffi[15-16.Citing Wayne R. LeFave, 4 Search
and Seizure, § 9.5(a) at 252 (3rd ed. 1996), the Court of Appeals properly noted that
"lesser traffic offenses1 are not suggestive of weapons. See Warren. 2001 UT App 346
at Tfl6 n.4. The court similarly noted that neither the suspected acts of prostitution or a
small scale drug transaction, nor the "lateness of the hour" or "lying about the status of
one's driver's license . . . suggested] the presence of weapons." Id. at 1J16 and n.4.
Again, the Court of Appeals1 holding in this regard in consistent with case law. In
Terry, for example, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the frisk of the defendant was
justified in part because the suspect was involved in a "daylight robbery - which, it is
reasonable to assume, would be likely to involve the use of weapons." 392 U.S. at 28.
By contrast, a minor traffic offense, in this case an illegal left turn and lane change
without a signal, see Warren, 2001 UT App 346 at ^4, does not imply the presence of
weapons. Indeed, there are a multitude of situations that arise daily in which a person
might be stopped for a minor traffic violation but not otherwise be involved in activity
that implied the presence of weapons or danger. These include taking kids to school,
driving to work in the morning, or going to the grocery store.
11

For this reason, the Fourth Amendment requires "a reasonable, articulable
suspicion that the person may be armed and dangerous before a police officer may search
a person who has been detained for a minor traffic infraction." Rhodes v. Com. 504
S.E.2d 390, 394 (Va. App. 1998) (quotation omitted). Indeed, in Pennsylvania v.
Mimms. 434 U.S. 106 (1977), the U.S. Supreme Court noted in dictum that a frisk of a
person pulled over for a minor traffic offense (expired license plate) and asked to step
out of the car was reasonable only because the officer observed a bulge in the suspect's
jacket suggesting a weapon. See also United States v. Michelletti, 13 F.3d 838, 842 (5th
Cir. 1994) (frisk justified where defendant kept right hand in pocket, "precisely where
weapon could be located," even when he opened door and held beer can in other hand);
United States v. Rideau, 969 F.2d 1572 (5th Cir. 1992) (frisk justified where defendant's
"moves took place after a detention, at night, in a high crime area where the carrying of
weapons is common").
To this end, the Court of Appeals opinion correctly holds that reasonable
suspicion of Warren was lacking and therefore thefriskwas unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment. Warren also properly recognizes that Officer Swensen
impermissibly acted off of "his inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or fhunch,,M
without any other reasonable indications that Warren was armed and dangerous. Terry,
392 U.S. at 27 (citations omitted). Officer Swensen observed Warren, an AfricanAmerican male, driving a grey Cadillac. See Warren. 2001 UT App 346 at %2; R.130:5.
12

Warren's car was stopped and he was talking to an unidentified individual who was
leaning into the passenger door of Warren's car. See. Warren, 2001 UT App 346 at %2;
R. 130:5. Officer Swensen did not hear any of the conversation between the two people,
and observed their activity for less than a minute. See Warren, 2001 UT App 346 at ^[3;
R. 130:6,15. He did not recognize either of the people and could not tell what they were
doing. See Warren, 2001 UT App 346 at 1J3; R.130[6,15]. Officer Swensen "assumed"
that they were involved in prostitution or a drug deal. See Warren, 2001 UT App 346 at
f3; R. 130:6-7. He based his assumption on the fact that it was early in the morning and
there were no open businesses in the area. See. Warren, 2001 UT App 346 at f3;
R.130:6-7.
Nonetheless, Officer Swensen did not approach Warren until a few minutes later
when he observed Warren make a left turn and a lane change without signaling. See
Warren, 2001 UT App 346 at f3; R. 130:6-7. Swensen pulled Warren over and requested
his license. See Warren, 2001 UT App 346 at ^4; R.130:8. Warren readily complied.
See Warren, 2001 UT App 346 at ^4; R.130:8. When Swensen discerned that the license
was expired, Warren explained that he had a current one, but that it had been stolen. See
Warren, 2001 UT App 346 at^4; R.130:8.
Swensen asked Warren about the activity that he observed earlier. See Warren,
2001 UT App 346 at ^[5; R.130:9. Warren said that his mother and the man's mother
were friends and that he dropped the man off after they were together at someone's
13

house. See Warren. 2001 UT App 346 at TJ5; R.130:9. Warren also said he was looking
for packing boxes for his sister. See Warren, 2001 UT App 346 at TJ5; R.130:9. The
questioning lasted two minutes, and Swensen conceded that it was not necessary to
effectuate the traffic stop. See Warren. 2001 UT App 346 atf5;R.130:18.
Swensen returned to his patrol car to check Warren's license and learned that it
was current but suspended for unpaid reinstatement fees. See Warren. 2001 UT App 346
at ^[6; R. 130:8-9. Swensen decided to impound the car, but testified that he did not
intend to arrest Warren. See Warren. 2001 UT App 346 at 1f6; R.130:10,21-22. Instead,
he had Warren exit the car. See Warren. 2001 UT App 346 at f6; R.130:10,21-22. He
frisked Warren. See Warren. 2001 UT App 346 at Tf6; R.130:10. Swensen testified that
he did not think Warren was armed, but that he did it as a matter of routine whenever he
takes someone out of a car or suspects drug or prostitution activity. See Warren. 2001
UTApp346at1f7andn.l;R.l30:l0-ll,20.
In light of these facts, the Court of Appeals properly concluded that Swensen
acted off mere "supposition that Warren and his unidentified companion were engaging
in a transaction for either prostitution or drugs.11 IdL. at ^}16. Given the Court of Appeals'
consideration of all the facts, it did not overlook that traffic stops may be dangerous.
Rather, it properly concluded that this was a minor traffic stop and, in light of the other
evidence, there was not a reasonable suspicion that Warren was armed and dangerous.
See Warren. 2001 UT App 346 at ^16 and n.4. The mere fact of the traffic stop was not
14

enough to establish a reasonable fear that Warren was armed and dangerous, especially
when Officer Swensen testified that he himself did not think that was the case. kL
Ultimately, Warren should be affirmed because it preserves the appropriately
narrow application of Terry and protects an individual's right to befreefrom
unreasonable searches and seizures. Since reasonableness is the touchstone of any
Fourth Amendment analysis, it would be patently unreasonable to adopt a rule that all
traffic stops are inherently dangerous and therefore a frisk is always justified in those
situations. It "would mean that every motorist issued a citation for a minor traffic offense
would enjoy no constitutional protection from a protective search for weapons." Simpler
v. State, 568 A.2d 22, 26-27 (Md. 1990). "'Indeed, if everyone is assumed to be armed
and dangerous until the officer is satisfied that he or she is not, then officers would be
able to frisk at will - a result not contemplated by the Fourth Amendment.1 Thus, [the
Fourth Amendment requires] a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the person may be
armed and dangerous before a police officer may search a person who has been detained
for a minor traffic infraction." Rhodes v. Com. 504 S.E.2d 390, 394 (Va. App. 1998)
(quotation omitted).
The State relies primarily upon Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977),
Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408 (1997), and State v. James, 2000 UT 80, 13 P.3d 576,
in support of its argument that traffic stops are inherently dangerous and therefore justify
the frisk in this case. S.B.7. The State also cites statistics and an article from the Deseret
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News (August 5, 2001) concerning the .anger that officers face during traffic stops. S.B.
11 (Addendum A).3 The cases cited by the State are distinguishable from Warren and the
statistics concerning officer safety do not change the fact that reasonable suspicion was
not present in this case.
First, Mimms, Wilson and James are all distinguishable because none of them
involve situations where the individual was frisked, but rather lesser intrusions incident
to traffic stops where the officers merely asked the driver / passenger to exit the car or
opened a car door. For example, the U.S. Supreme Court in Mimms held that an officer
was justified in ordering the suspect out of his car after he was stopped for driving with
an expired license plate. 434 U.S. at 107,111. The Court determined that this added
intrusion above and beyond the traffic stop was a ""petty indignity"" considering that it
only meant the difference between the individual sitting in the car and standing outside
of it. Id. (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 17). Such a minimal intrusion was reasonable
"when balanced against legitimate concerns for the officer's safety." Id. at 111. The
specific concerns for officer safety arosefromthe possibility that a suspect may have
access to a weapon or may be able to make unobserved movements in a car, as well as
the "hazard of accidental injury from passing traffic to an officer standing on the driver's
side of the vehicle" which is avoided by asking the "driver... to step out of the car and
off onto the shoulder of the road" where it is safer. Id. at 110-11.
3

The newspaper article that the State cites is not part of the appellate record.
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The Mimms Court did not state that an officer may go ahead and frisk the
individual as well, noting that the government was not making that argument on appeal.
Id at 110 n.5. The defendant in that case was frisked. See 434 U.S. at 113 (discussed
supra). The propriety of that frisk was not at issue, however. Id. at 109. The Court
stated in dictum that the frisk was permissible only because a bulge in the suspect's jacket
became apparent when the officer asked him to step out of the car. Id. at 107,111. Since
the bulge suggested a weapon, the officer had a reasonable suspicion that the suspect was
armed, necessitating the frisk. Id at 111. Nothing in Mimms expresses or implies that
the fact of the traffic stop alone justified the frisk. If anything, Mimms indicates that in
ordinary traffic stops, absent other indications of a weapon, the precaution of asking a
driver out of the car adequately addresses the officer's safety concerns.
The U.S. Supreme Court extended its holding in Mimms to vehicle passengers in
its subsequent Wilson opinion. 519 U.S. at 410. In that case, the driver was legitimately
stopped for speeding and an expired registration tag. IJL After the driver voluntarily got
out of the car, the officer asked the passenger to get out as well. Id. The passenger
appeared sweaty and nervous. Id. at 410-11. A quantity of crack cocaine fell to the
ground when the passenger exited. Id. at 411. The Court held that the officer was
reasonable in asking the passenger to get out of the car because the safety concerns for
the officer were the same. Id. at 414-15. Additionally, although a passenger has a
greater liberty interest since he was not the one that committed the traffic violation, the
17

intrusion was still slight considering that a passenger has as much motive as the driver to
"employ violence to avoid apprehension11 and the passenger was already stopped by
virtue of the traffic stop. Id. at 414. As with Mimms, the Wilson opinion does not
address frisks of individuals during traffic stops.
Similarly, in James, this Court held that an officer may open a car door for
purposes of investigating the driver within the context of a lawful stop for a traffic
violation. 2000 UT App 80 at ffl[12-13. In that case, the officer received a report that the
defendant was driving recklessly. Id. at ^|2. The officer stopped defendant's car in a
driveway, but the defendant did not get out. Id. The officer saw two people in the car
and opened the door and asked the defendant to exit. IJL at f3. This Court noted that the
officer legally opened the door incidental to his lawful stop and investigation of the
defendant. Id. at % 13. It was not an illegal, separate search of the car. Id. This Court
cited Wilson and Mimms in recognizing the need for officer safety during traffic stops,
and acknowledged that danger was inherent in this context. Id. at ^|10 n.3. It did not,
however, rule that the inherent danger of a traffic stop justified a frisk of the individual
who was pulled from the car without further evidence of a firearm. See generally James,
2000 UT 80 at ffl[8-13.
Neither Mimms, Wilson, nor James justify a rule that traffic stops are inherently
dangerous and therefore justify an automatic frisk of the individual. Their holdings
cannot be stretched that far without eviscerating the protections of the Fourth
18

Amendment. At most, they set forth the proposition that safety concerns inhere in traffic
stops, and for that reason the limited intrusions discussed in those cases are appropriate.
It would be unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment to allow for automatic frisks
when these other protective options are available to an officer who stops someone for a
moving violation.
Indeed, a frisk of Warren or any individual stopped during a routine traffic stop,
without other indicators leading to a reasonable suspicion of weapons, goes far beyond
the Mde minimis" intrusion of asking a driver or passenger out of a car that is already
legitimately stopped and cannot prevail when weighed against the interest in maintaining
personal liberty. Mimms. 434 U.S. at 111. In Knowles v. Iowa. 525 U.S. 113 (1998),
the Supreme Court held that an officer could not even search the inside of a vehicle after
he had stopped and cited the driver for speeding. Id. at 114. The Court recognized the
need for officer safety during traffic stops, stating,
[t]his is not to say that the concern for officer safety is absent in the case of
a routine traffic stop. It plainly is not. But while the concern for officer
safety in this context may justify the "minimal11 additional intrusion of
ordering a driver and passengers out of the car, it does not by itself justify
the often considerably greater intrusion attending a fullfield-typesearch.
Id at 117 (citing Mimms. 434 U.S. at 111; Wilson, 519 U.S. at 414). It follows from
Knowles that a search of an individual's person is impermissible during a traffic stop
without other factors giving rise to a reasonable suspicion that he or she is armed and
dangerous. One's person is even more sacrosanct than the interior of their car. A bodily
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frisk, therefore, involves an even greater intrusion than the impermissible search of the
car at issue in Knowles. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals correctly decided that the
frisk of Warren was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment where the officer
testified that he did not suspect Warren was armed or dangerous and where the
circumstances did not otherwise reasonably suggest the presence of weapons. See
Warren, 2001 UT App 346 at ^16.
B. The Court of Appeals Gave Due Consideration to the Totality of the
Circumstances.
Contrary to the State's assertion, the Warren opinion is properly based on an
analysis of the totality of the circumstances. See United States v. Arvizu. 122 S.Ct. 744,
751 (2002) (holding that reasonableness of search under Fourth Amendment must be
based on analysis of totality of circumstances). First, the opinion is premised on Terry,
the touchstone of which is a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis. See 2001 UT App
346 at 11[13-16; see also Terry 392 U.S. at 9 (n[t]he question is whether in all the
circumstances of this on-the-street encounter, [defendant's] right to personal security was
violated by an unreasonable search and seizure11) (emphasis added). Moreover, the Court
of Appeals begins its discussion by referencing the fact-specific nature of the inquiry:
11

[although f[i]t is not essential that an officer actually have been in fear1 to perform a

Terry frisk, the State must present articulable facts that would reasonably lead an
objective officer to conclude that the suspect may be armed." Warren. 2001 UT App 346
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i il f 14 (quoting State v. Cartel ; 0 71"i: 2d 656, 6:59 (I Jtal i 1985)) (emphasis added).
Conseqi lei ill) , n>nlr?m In (lit; Slnlc's nsscrlnini lln1 illiil ilih, an il1 -as is "in K'rukvd" h linn1
Court of Appeals. S.B. 8.
More than just being referenced, the totality analysis is actually applied in Warren.
The Court of Appeals noted the searching officer's inchoate "supposition" that "Warren
and his unidentified companion were engaging in a transaction for either prostitution or
drugs ' \\ arrciu 20111 Ml <\pp Urn ill ^llh

lln I uiiiift n Ininll in

S^CIIM

iir Mr.piuun a.

"supposition" because he only observed Warren and the unidentified individual together
"for less than a minute, did not hear any of the conversation that took place, and could
not tell what the two people were doing, and did not recognize the vehicle or individuals
fi om prior encounters

(ill, al "l

llso nnlnl Ilia! liii/ uffu IT admitted' Ihal "li ' did not

believe Warren was armed at the time he decided to frisk him." IdL. Based on these facts,
the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that the officer lacked individualized suspicion
that Warren was armed and dangerous as required by Terry, 5{Kl 1 S. all

I See Warren,

2001 l l'l App 34'f"t a) ^|l(\' sec supra (di^uissini.' legal siipp<m \\w Court ol Appi'*il.s'
decision).
The Court of Appeals considered the other factors of Warren's case as well,
concluding that the situation itself did not support a reasonable suspicion that Warren
^ as aiiiicii ami daiif.a 11HIS ;>IV ,001 I I I 'ipp

\h Jl ]\U\ I irai lhr oaiiiill notn! lli.it

"'lesser traffic offenses1" such as the one involved in this case (a stop for an illegal lane
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change and turning without a signal) "are not suggestive of weapons." Id. at ^[16 n.4
(quoting Wayne R. LeFave, 4 Search and Seizure, §9.5(a) at 256 (3rd ed. 1996)). The
Court of Appeals also considered the "lateness of the hour" (4:45 a.m.) and the fact that
Warren "lied about the status of [his] driver's license," but concluded that they did not
suggest the presence of weapons without other evidence to support it. Id_; see infra
(discussing legal support for Court of Appeals1 decision).
The full and appropriate consideration of the facts in Warren distinguishes it from
Arvizu, where the lower court, reversed on appeal, expressly excluded or isolated certain
factors in its consideration of the reasonableness of the search at issue there. See 122
S.Ct. at 750. There, an officer observed the defendant driving along a desolate desert
backroad in southeast Arizona, an area known for drug trafficking. IdL at 748-49. The
defendant drove a minivan, which the officer knew in his experience to be the sort of
vehicle used by smugglers. Id at 749. The van slowed significantly as it approached the
officer's patrol car. Id. The driver in the van (defendant) did not look over at the officer
as he passed, and his posture appeared stiff and rigid as he drove. IdL The officer
observed two children sitting in the back of the van with their knees unusually high, "as
if their feet were propped up on some cargo on the floor." Id.
The officer followed the van. Id. The children put their hands up at the same time
and waved at him "in an abnormal partem . . . as if they were being instructed" for four to
five minutes. Id The driver made an abrupt turn-off at the last possible place to avoid a
22
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an area known for narcotics trafficking. Id. The officer stopped ihc \ an and asked the
defendant if he could search it. Id. Defendant agreed. Id. The officer located marijuana
in a linftk hay

IIJKK I

llic Uiiklu'ii's led,, and nunc m another bag in the rear of the van.
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reasonable suspicion, noting that
fact-specific weighing of circumstances or other multifactor tests
introduced Ma troubling degree of uncertainty and unpredictability" into the
Fourth Amendment analysis. It therefore "attempted]
to describe and
clearly delimit the extent to which certain factors may be considered by law
enforcement officers in making stops,, ., After characterizing the District
Court's analysis as relying on a list of 10 factors, the Court of Appeals
proceeded to examine each in turn. It held that 7 of the factors, including
respondent's slowing down, his failure to acknowledge [the officer], the
raised position of the children's knees, and their odd waving carried little or
no weight in the reasonable suspicion calculus. The remaining factors - the
road's use by smugglers, the temporal proximity between [defendant's] trip
and the agents' shift change, and the use of mini vans by smugglers - were
not enough to render the stop permissible.

Id at 750,
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit, reasoning that the lower
C0UIf s

"rejection of se\ en of the listed factors in isolation from each other does not take

Hindi iHYiinnf the "Mfilil", .^lli,,,., . ii.'mnstmnvs,1 ,TI OIU rus js h.m nndcrsl vnl tli.it phi,1st1 "
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Id at 751. Although each factor could be "innocent in itself," they could amount to
reasonable suspicion in the aggregate. Id. (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 22). Moreover, a
totality analysis gives proper weight to an officer's "own experience and specialized
training to make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information
available to them that 'might well elude an untrained person.1" Id. (citing Ornelas v.
United States. 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996)).
The Court of Appeals in Warren did not attempt to "'delimit1 an officer's
consideration of certain factors" in its analysis as occurred in Arvizu. See Arvizu, 122
S.Ct. at 751; see Warren, 2001 UT 346 atffi[12-16.Nor did it reject any particular factor
or consider it in isolation from the others. Id. Rather, the Court of Appeals properly
concluded, based on an assessment of all the facts of the case, that without more the
traffic stop at issue here did not reasonably suggest the presence of a weapon sufficient to
justify the frisk that occurred. Id.
CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing, Warren respectfully requests this Court to affirm the
Court of Appeals' decision in State v. Warren since the decision is properly based on an
analysis of the totality of the circumstances and squares with Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence. As such, the Court of Appeals correctly held that the frisk of Warren was
not justified by reasonable suspicion where the officer testified that he did not suspect
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\\ arren po^cil a lineal .mil lln.1 ciicuiiislain.es did nul nlliciwise suggest that he was armed
and dangerous.
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for investigatory or other purposes and reasonably
believes that the individual may be armed and
dangerous, the officer may conduct a frisk or
pat-down search of the individual to discover
weapons that might be used against h-v. '• ^
Const.Amend. 4

No. 20000495-CA.
Nov.,, 16,2001
Defendant was convicted in the Third District
Court, Salt Lake County, Sheila K. McCleve, J., of
possession of a controlled substance. Defendant
appealed. The Court of Appeals, Orme, J., held that:
(1) police officer did not have any reasonable
suspicion that defendant, who was cited for traffic
violations, was armed to justify Terry frisk, and (2)
remand to trial court was not appropriate to
determine if seizure of cocaine and drug
paraphernalia from defendant was justified under
inevitable discovery exception to exclusionary rule.
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Thorne, Jr., J., concurred in part, dissented in part,
and filed an opinion.
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110k 1134(3) Most Cited Cases
t ' riminal Law ^~•'! \*M i >
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i lUKi f:;8i4) Most Cited Cases
The factual findings underlying a ti ial court's
decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress
evidence are reviewed under the deferential clearlyerroneous standard, and the legal conclusions are
reviewed for correctness, with a measure of
discretion given to the trial judge's application of
the legal standard to the facts.

|3J Arrest €=>63.5(8)
35k63.5(8) Most Cited Cases
Although it is not essential that an officer actually
have been in fear to perform a Terry frisk, the State
must present articulable facts that would reasonably
lead an objective officer to conclude that the
suspect may be armed; a mere unparticularized
suspicion or hunch is not sufficient. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 4,
[41 Arrest o~'oJ.5(8)
35k63.5(8) Most Cited Cases
Facts and circumstances unique to the particulai
suspect and/or factual contextmay give rise to a
reasonable suspicion the suspect may be armed to
warrant a Terry frisk, such as a suspect with a
bulge in his clothing that appears to be a weapon or
a suspect who is hesitant in denying that he is armed
and
aggressively
approaches
the
officer
immediately
upon being stopped
U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend, 4
[5| Arrest €=>63.5(8)
35k63.5(8) Most Cited Cases
If the inherent nature o« w
. uiie being
investigated leads an officer t. a reasonable
suspicion that a suspect may be armed, a Terry frisk
may be warranted. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.
[6] Arrest €==>63.5(8)
35k63.5(8) Most Cited Cases
Only where there is a reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity and the nature of the crime
suggests an increased likelihood that the suspect is
armed can a frisk be justified. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 4.

|2| Arrest €=»63.5(8)
j5kt>3.5(8) Most Cited Cases

, ! \,jtomobiles€=>349.5(10)
4bAk 349.5(10) Most Cited Cases

Where a police officer \ alidly stops ai i individual
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that defendant, who was cited for traffic violations,
was armed to justify Terry frisk, where officer
testified at suppression hearing that he did not
believe defendant was armed at time he decided to
frisk defendant. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.
[8] Criminal Law €=>394.1(3)
110k394.1(3) Most Cited Cases
[8] Criminal Law €=>394.6(4)
110k394.6(4) Most Cited Cases
Inevitable discovery is a valid exception to the
exclusionary rule; however, under the inevitable
discovery doctrine, State has the burden to establish
by a preponderance of the evidence that the
information ultimately would have been discovered
by lawful means. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4
[9] Criminal Law €==>H81.5(7)
1 lOkl 181.5(7) Most Cited Cases
Remand to trial court was not appropriate to
determine if seizure of cocaine and drug
paraphernalia from defendant was justified under
inevitable discovery exception to exclusionary rule;
no evidence in record could have sustained findings
that police would have inevitably discovered
cocaine and paraphernalia. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend.
4.
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Before JACKSON, Associate P.J., and ORME and
THORNE, Jr., JJ.
OPINION
ORME, Judge:
1f 1 Appellant Eric Jarvis Warren seeks to
overturn his conviction for possession of a
controlled substance, a third degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i)
(Supp.1999). Specifically, he contends the trial
court erred in denying his motion to suppress
evidence he alleges was seized in violation of his
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Fourth Amendment rights. Warren argues that the
evidence obtained from the police officer's search
should have been suppressed because, inter alia, he
was illegally frisked. The State counters with,
among other things, the claim that the evidence
would inevitably have been discovered. We
reverse.
BACKGROUND
T| 2
"Because
a determination
of
the
reasonableness of... police conduct is highly factual
in nature, we review the facts in detail." State v.
Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85, 86 (Utah Ct.App. 1987). On
November 28, 1999, at approximately 4:45 a.m.,
Officer Nathan Swensen observed a grey Cadillac
pulled over to the side of the road near the
intersection of 200 South and 200 East streets in
downtown Salt Lake City. Occupying the driver's
seat of that vehicle was appellant Warren, a
thirty-eight year old African-American male.
Officer Swensen also observed another unidentified
individual leaning into the front passenger's side
door of Warren's car.
| 3 Officer Swensen observed this activity for less
than a minute, did not hear any of the conversation
that took place, could not tell what the two people
were doing, and did not recognize the vehicle or
individuals from prior encounters. Nonetheless,
Officer Swensen assumed that Warren and the
unidentified individual were engaged in a
transaction involving either drugs or prostitution.
Officer Swensen testified that he based his
suspicion on the fact that it was early in the morning
and there were no open businesses or residences in
the vicinity. Despite his suspicions, Officer
Swensen did not then approach Warren's vehicle or
the unidentified man, who departed on foot.
f 4 Officer Swensen then observed Warren pull
away from the curb and make a left turn onto 200
South, followed by a lane change, without signaling.
Officer Swensen pulled Warren over after
observing the traffic violation. He requested
Warren's driver's license and vehicle registration.
Warren readily provided the requested materials.
Officer Swensen noticed that the license had
expired in 1995. Warren explained that he had a
current license, but that it had been stolen.
\ 5 Officer Swensen then set about to ascertain
why Warren was out at that time of night and what
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t le ! lad been, doing with the unidentified man. I le
asked questions regarding who the unidentified man
was, what they were doing, and whether Warren had
dropped the man off or just met him. Warren
responded by telling Officer Swensen that his
mother and the man's mother were acquaintances
and that he dropped the man off after they had been
together at someone's house. Warren also
indicated that he had been looking for packing
boxes for his sister, who was moving. Officer
Swensen's questioning lasted approximately two
minutes. Officer Swensen conceded at the
suppression hearing that these questions were
unrelated to and unnecessary for the proper
effectuation of tl ic traffic stop,
*272 K 6 Officer Swensen returned to his patrol
car, checked Warren's license, and learned that it
was otherwise current but had been suspended for
failure to pay reinstatement fees. Officer Swensen
then decided to impound Warren's car. He asked
Warren to get out of the car to sign citations for
failure to signal and for driving without a valid
license. Officer Swensen testified he did not intend
to arrest Warren and only had him exit the vehicle
to inform him about the impound and to sign, the
citations
K 7 When Warren was out of the car, Officer
Swensen frisked him. He did not believe that
Warren was armed or dangerous, but frisked him as
a matter of routine. [FN1] A white plastic "twist,"
later identified as cocaine, fell from Warren's waist
during the frisk, whereupon Warren was arrested.
An inventory search of Warren's car uncovered a
knife concealed under the armrest, and a more
in-depth search of Warren's person, incident to
arrest, led to the discovery of more cocaine and a
glass pipe,
FN1. In fact, when asked, the officer
testified that his reasons for the frisk were
"[j]ust from training, and for my safety,
and everybody that was there, their safety.
Whenever I pull somebody out of a car, I
perform a Terry frisk just to see if there's
weapons. Also because of the fact that with
there being drug activity and prostitution
and so on, people that are involved in that
usually carry weapons. So with that in
mind, also for the fact that I always do
Copr. ©V - ' "'•( ' \ .
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^j g Warren m o v e c | t 0 S U pp r e s s the cocaine and
pipe as evidence, claiming (1) that the scope of the
detention and questioning went beyond the purpose
of the traffic stop and (2) that the frisk was not
justified by a reasonable suspicion that he was
armed. The trial court denied the motion,
concluding that the questioning was reasonable
given the officer's personal observations and
resulting suspicion. The court also ruled that the
frisk was justified by the officer's legitimate concern
for his safety.
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
*i V : 1\L ; SM.V\; presented in this appeal are
whether ihc trial court, in denying appellant's
motion to suppress, correctly determined that (1)
Officer Swensen properly extended the scope of the
traffic stop beyond its original purpose and (2) the
officer's search of Warren did not violate the Fourth
Amendment.
[1] K 10 "The 'factual findings underlying a. tt ial
court's decision to grant or deny a motion to
suppress evidence are reviewed under the
deferential clearly-erroneous standard, and the legal
conclusions are reviewed for correctness, with a
measure of discretion given to the trial judge's
application of the legal standard to the facts." State
v. Moreno, 910 P.2d 1245, 1247 (Utah Ct App/),
cert, denied, 916 P.2d 909 (Utah 1996),
% 11 The State argues that even if the actions of
Officer
Swensen
violated
Warren's
Fourth
Amendment rights, the case should be remanded to
the trial court to determine if the evidence acquired
from the investigation should nonetheless be
admitted because it would inevitably have been
discovered.
1 LEGALITY OF FRISK
Warren argues that the evidence obtained
iivm his person was inadmissible at trial because he
was frisked absent any reasonable suspicion that he
was armed. He points out that at the suppression
hearing Officer Swensen testified he did not believe
Warren to be armed at the time he decided to frisk
him. The State insists that Officer Swensen's
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search of Warren was objectively reasonable under
the Supreme Court's decision in Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968),
"[g]iven the circumstances of the traffic stop,
including the deserted downtown area at an
unusually early hour, defendant's lie about the
validity of his license, and recognition that traffic
stops are inherently dangerous." [FN2]

FN2. Apparently recognizing the lack of
any articulable facts that would reasonably
lead to an inference that Warren and his
acquaintance were engaged in a drug or
prostitution transaction, the State on appeal
does not seriously press this angle as a
basis for suspecting Warren was armed.

[2] K 13 The State's argument reflects a
fundamental misunderstanding of the Terry *273
holding, which is not nearly as open-ended as the
State seems to suggest.
In Terry, the Supreme Court established a
narrowly drawn exception to the Fourth
Amendment requirement that police obtain a
warrant for all searches. Where a police officer
validly stops an individual for investigatory or
other purposes and reasonably believes that the
individual may be armed and dangerous, the
officer may conduct a "frisk" or "pat-down
search of the individual to discover weapons that
might be used against him.
State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 659 (Utah 1985)
(emphasis added).
[3] % 14 Although "[i]t is not essential that an
officer actually have been in fear" to perform a
Terry frisk, the State must present articulable facts
that would reasonably lead an objective officer to
conclude that the suspect may be armed. Id. "A
mere unparticularized suspicion or hunch is not
sufficient." Id.
[4][5][6] K 15 Two basic scenarios may warrant a
Terry frisk. In the first, facts and circumstances
unique to the particular suspect and/or factual
context may give rise to a reasonable suspicion the
suspect may be armed, such as a suspect with a
bulge in his clothing that appears to be a weapon or
a suspect who is hesitant in denying that he is armed
and
aggressively
approaches
the
officer
Copr. © West 2002 No Claim
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immediately upon being stopped. See State v.
Rochell, 850 P.2d 480, 483 (Utah Ct.App.1993);
Wayne R. LaFave, 4 Search and Seizure, § 9.5(a),
at 252, 257 (3rd ed.1996). In the second scenario,
it is not so much the peculiarities of the suspect and
circumstances as it is the inherent nature of the
crime being investigated that leads to the reasonable
suspicion that the suspect may be armed. The
leading
treatise
on
Fourth
Amendment
jurisprudence explains that while it may be
reasonable for an officer to frisk a suspect who has
been stopped based upon a suspicion that he is
engaging in criminal activity for which an offender
would likely be armed, it does not follow that
officers are free to frisk any individual suspected of
any crime. [FN3] See Wayne R. LaFave, 4 Search
and Seizure, § 9.5(a), at 254-59 (3rd ed.1996).
Crimes that, by their nature, suggest the presence of
weapons include: "robbery, burglary, rape, assault
with weapons, homicide, and dealing in large
quantities of narcotics." Id. at 255-56 (footnotes
omitted). "But for other types of crimes, such as
trafficking in small quantities of narcotics,
possession of marijuana, illegal possession of
liquor, prostitution,
bookmaking,
shoplifting,
underage drinking, driving under the influence and
lesser traffic offenses, minor assault without
weapons, or vagrancy," there must be particular
facts which lead the officer to believe that a suspect
is armed. Id. at 256-57 (footnotes omitted).

FN3. This court has expressed an
unwillingness to characterize a frisk as
justified where the possibility of a crime
being committed is speculative at best and
the officer's suspicions do "not generally
implicate an inherently dangerous situation
or specifically indicate that the suspect [is]
armed." State v. White, 856 P.2d 656,
663-66 (Utah Ct.App.1993) (holding that
"unfounded
allegations of
attenuated
domestic violence" and suspicion of
cocaine use did not justify an immediate
frisk). Only where there is a reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity and the
nature of the crime suggests an increased
likelihood that the suspect is armed can a
frisk be justified. See id; State v. Carter,
707 P.2d 656, 660 (Utah
1985)
(authorizing the frisk of a burglary suspect
who matched a police radio description
Orig. U.S. Govt. Works
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because an officer could reasonably
conclude that a burglary suspect might be
carrying dangerous tools or weapons);
State v. Dorsey, 731 P.2d 1085, 1092
(Utah 1986) (Zimmerman, J., concurring)
(explaining that Terry frisk of suspect
reasonably believed to be involved in
moving large quantities of illegal drugs
over long distances was justified).

[7] 1 16 Beyond his supposition that Warren and
his unidentified companion were engaging in a
transaction for either prostitution or drugs, Officer
Swensen did not provide the trial court with any
facts that justified a Terry frisk. The fact that
Officer Swensen candidly admitted at the
suppression hearing that he did not believe Warren
was armed at the time he decided to frisk him
clearly takes Officer Swensen's actions outside of
Terry's limited justification for warrantless searches.
Nor do the facts urged by the State on appeal to
rationalize the frisk furnish the required foundation.
[FN4] We therefore conclude *274 that the search
violated Warren's Fourth Amendment rights, and
the. evidence obtained thereby should have been
suppressed. [FN5]

FN4. See 1 12, supra. As noted, "iessei
traffic offenses" are not suggestive of
weapons. Wayne R. LaFave, 4 Search
and Seizure, § 9.5(a), at 256 (3rd
ed.1996). Nor is the lateness of the hour.
See id. at 260. Similarly, lying about the
status of one's driver's license does not
suggest the presence of weapons.
FN5. Having concluded that the evidence
obtained should have been suppressed due
to the unlawful frisk, we need not address
whether Officer Swensen also violated
Warren's
rights
by
impermissibly
extending his questioning beyond the
scope of the traffic stop.
; HVITABLE DISCOVERY
.>, * . . i .JC btate argues that even if the search
was unlaw iul, this case should be remanded to the

trial court to determine if the seizure of cocaine and
paraphernalia
from
Warren's
person
was
nonetheless justified
under
the
"inevitable
discovery" exception to the exclusionary rule.
"Inevitable discovery is a valid exception to the
exclusionary rule[.]" State v. Topanotes, 2000 UT
App 311,1 10, 14 P.3d 695,, However, under the
inevitable discovery doctrine, the State has the
burden to " 'establish by a preponderance of the
evidence that the information ultimately would have
been discovered by lawful means.' " Id. (quoting
State v. James, 2000 UT 80,1 16, 13 P.3d 576).
[9] *f 18 li i making its argument, the State
correctly points out that the trial court did not make
findings of fact addressing this issue. The State
argues the trial court should have the opportunity to
do so now. However, in so arguing the State fails
to recognize that this lack of findings relevant to
inevitable discovery was not due to some lapse or
oversight by the trial court, or even to a mistake of
law. Rather, the State failed to timely advance the
theory or present evidence to support it.
1 19 Altl lough tl le State bore tl ie burdei i of
proving that the evidence would inevitably 1ia\e
been discovered by lawful means, not one word
about inevitable discovery was mentioned during
the suppression hearing itself. No evidence in
contemplation of that theory was introduced by the
State, nor was it mentioned in the brief oral
argument that concluded the hearing. Rather, the
idea surfaced for the first time only in subsequent
briefing and a later round of oral arguments when it
was raised, with apologies for its untimeliness, by a
different prosecutor than the one who handled the
actual suppression hearing.
1 20 Moreover, there is absolutely no evidence in
the record that would sustain findings in support of
a determination that discovery of the drugs and
paraphernalia on Warren's person would have been
inevitable, along the lines theorized by the State on
appeal, even had he not been frisked. Although the
arresting officer did testily that he impounded
Warren's car, there was no testimony that, following
such impoundment, an inventory search of the
vehicle would have been made. No testimony
established the procedure, scope, and criteria of
such a search, in accordance with preestablished
departmental guidelines, so that the legality of such
a search could be gauged. See generally State v.
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Shamblin,
763
P.2d
425, 426-27
(Utah
Ct.App.1988). The record contains no evidence
showing that such a search would have uncovered
the knife, much less that such discovery would have
prompted further immediate contact with Warren.
There was no testimony that the officers would have
been able to quickly locate Warren after
discovering the weapon, or that he still would have
had narcotics and paraphernalia on his person at the
time of any such later encounter.
% 21 Because no evidence in the record would
support findings establishing inevitable discovery,
remand would be a meaningless gesture that should
be avoided in the interest of judicial economy. In
State v. Hagen, 802 P.2d 745 (Utah Ct.App.1990),
rev'd on other grounds, 858 P.2d 925 (Utah 1992),
affd, 510 U.S. 399, 114 S.Ct. 958, 127 L.Ed.2d 252
(1994), we explained that a remand is not
appropriate where "there is simply no way [the]
evidence [can] be 'weighed' by the trial court to
come to the conclusion that the state [has] met its
burden." Id. at 747. As in Hagen, there is no way
in this case that the trial court, lacking any relevant
evidence, could properly determine that the *275
police would have inevitably discovered the cocaine
and pipe. See id.
CONCLUSION
K 22 Because when Officer Swensen frisked
Warren he did not believe, and had no basis on
which to reasonably conclude, that Warren might be
armed, the frisk was unlawful. The evidence
procured as a result of that frisk must be
suppressed. Further, because the State failed to
meet its burden to establish the discovery of the
evidence was inevitable, that theory has long since
been foreclosed. Remand for consideration of that
theory's applicability at this late date cannot be
justified in the complete absence of any evidence
addressing inevitable discovery. Accordingly, we
reverse and remand for a new trial or such other
proceedings as may now be appropriate.

U 23 I CONCUR: NORMAN H. JACKSON,
Associate Presiding Judge.

THORNE, Jr., Judge (concurring in part, dissenting
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in part):

\ 24 I concur with the principle portion of the
majority's opinion, however, I feel that deciding the
issue of inevitable discovery at this level without
permitting the trial court the opportunity to consider
it is unwise.
t 25 I agree that the record presented to this court
is insufficient on its face to support a conclusion of
"inevitable discovery." However, I disagree with
the decision to foreclose any further examination of
this issue in the name of "judicial economy,"
particularly since, as the majority points out, it was
not addressed below. The majority seems intent on
establishing an ill conceived rule requiring the state
to raise every possible argument in response to a
motion to suppress. The majority would foreclose
the possibility for additional evidence and
additional argument directed at this specific
question under the belief that the prosecution has
had an opportunity to present such an issue, but
chose not to, thereby surrendering the option to ever
raise it again.
\ 26 In my experience, the question of "inevitable
discovery" is often not ripe for discussion until and
unless the trial court concludes that a violation of
the Fourth Amendment has occurred. Further, until
a trial court has reached such a conclusion,
requiring such an effort would waste valuable
resources for the parties and the trial courts.
\ 27 I believe both wisdom and precedent support
a more balanced approach permitting further
exploration of questions like "inevitable discovery"
after a trial court has determined that the Fourth
Amendment has been violated. See Murray v.
United States, 487 U.S. 533, 543, 108 S.Ct. 2529,
2536, 101 L.Ed.2d 472 (1988) (vacating the
judgment and remanding the case for further
hearings on the issue of the "independent source"
doctrine, which had not been previously addressed);
State v. Wagoner, 126 N.M. 9, 966 P.2d 176,
(Ct.App.1998) (stating "[T]he district court made
no findings, oral or written, regarding these issues.
When the prosecutor began to argue for application
of the inevitable-discovery exception, the district
court cut him off by expressing its disapproval of
the exception. Consequently, we must remand to
the district court to determine whether the inevitable
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FN!. If the trial court properly determines
that the search did not violate the Fourth
Amendment, it would be wasted effort to
also require that the court take evidence
and make findings concerning inevitable
discovery at the same time.

11 28 Moreover, I also disagree with tl ic majority's
foray into findings of fact concerning this issue
following our admission that the record is
insufficient to fully address the issue. I believe that
it is not our role to make findings of fact, and absent
a proper finding of fact "application of the proper
rule of law is difficult, if not impossible, and the
reviewing function of this court is seriously
undermined." Rucker v. Dalton, 598 P.2d 1336,
1339 (Utah 1*= 'o : .
\ 29 Accordingly, I make no judgment as to tlie
ultimate determination of whether the evidence in
this particular matter would have inevitably been
discovered, but I would permit the trial court to
receive additional evidence *276 and hear
additional argument on the question. Moreover, I
do not believe the majority is correct in stating that
"remand would be a meaningless gesture that
should be avoided in the interest of judicial
economy." Therefore I dissent.
37 p.3d 270, 434 Utah Adv. Rep. 31, 200! U I App
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